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Abstract. This paper explores the main contours of recent work in english-
speaking philosophy of religion on the justification of religious belief. It sets out 
the main characteristics of the religious epistemologies of such writers as Alston, 
Plantinga, and Swinburne. It poses and seeks to answer the question of how far 
any or all of these epistemologies are indebted or similar to the epistemology of 
the Scottish enlightenment thinker Thomas reid. It concludes that while there 
are some links to reid in recent writing, contemporary approaches depart from 
reid’s views on the specific topic of the justification of religious belief.
INtroDuCtIoN
my aim in this paper is to present a survey of the contemporary debate 
as to ‘positive epistemic status’ and religious belief highlighting (as 
much as I can) the use of reid and Scottish philosophy in contemporary 
philosophy of religion.
There is a great deal that can be done by way of fulfilling this aim, since 
reid is referred to frequently by important protagonists in contemporary 
english-speaking religious epistemology – though only reid: I  have 
come across no mention in this literature to other Scottish philosophers 
(except of course for David Hume).
The most important figures in debates about the rationality and 
justification of religious belief in the last 20 years have been William 
Alston, Alvin Plantinga and richard Swinburne. Nicholas Wolterstorff 
also deserves a mention here, but though he is not in any sense a follower 
of Plantinga, his work tends (unfairly) to be regarded as a supplement 
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to Plantinga’s. Alston, Plantinga and Wolterstorff are regarded as 
representatives of so-called reformed epistemology. This is misleading 
because Alston was not a reformed thinker but an episcopalian (i.e. uS 
Anglican). All three evince an approach to justification, rationality or 
warrant in religious belief that is either anti-evidentialist or that plays 
down the importance of backing religious beliefs by evidence in granting 
them positive epistemic status.
Swinburne’s contribution to religious epistemology is by contrast one 
that makes great play with finding evidence for religious beliefs. He has 
constructed a complex apologetic for the Christian creed. It commences 
with an inductive, evidential case for truth of the bare claim that there is 
a God and then proceeds to an evidential case for specifically Christian 
claims about God.
There is a  relation between Swinburne and 18th century british 
philosophy but it is not with North britain. Swinburne evidently stands 
in a  tradition that includes Joseph butler and his Analogy of Religion. 
His appeal to natural theology and to probability as the basis of religious 
assent is butlerian. There are also notable links between his case for the 
rationality of assent to revelation and that which is contained in locke’s 
writings.
The differences between Plantinga and co., on the one hand, and 
Swinburne, on the other, might seem to be great. Swinburne is an 
evidentialist in epistemology and also an internalist. The reformed 
epistemologists are anti-evidentialist and move towards the application 
of externalist epistemologies to religious belief. (This is latter move is 
notable in Plantinga’s three books on warrant and in Alston’s appeal to 
doxastic practices as the locus of justified belief.) It must be said, however, 
that there are areas of agreement between these apparently divergent 
approaches to religious epistemology. It is notable that in Perceiving God1 
Alston can appeal to natural theology as a supplement to the justification 
of religious beliefs provided by the fact that they are generated by 
a doxastic practice whose reliability has not been refuted. There is also 
a  significant fact about Swinburne’s apologetic scheme that places him 
closer to the reformed epistemologists. In Chapter 13 of The Existence of 
1 William Alston, Perceiving God (Ithaca and london: Cornell university Press, 1991)
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God2 he places great weight on religious experience as ‘evidence’ for the 
truth of his core theism. but his use of religious experience is in fact not 
evidential in the strict sense. He contends that claims to experience God 
are to be considered as analogous to ordinary sense-perceptual claims 
and these claims are non-inferentially justified in the circumstances that 
give rise to them. Sense-perceptual beliefs for Swinburne are not justified 
through being the product of good inferences from further data. They 
are basic beliefs, innocent until proved guilty. And in this he is close to 
Plantinga, the first phase of whose reformed epistemology can be seen 
as based on an appeal to religious experience.
Thus our contrast between an anti-evidentialist movement 
in reformed epistemology and an evidentialist rearguard action 
in Swinburne is too simple. The reformed epistemologists may see some 
role for the evidences for God collected in traditional natural theology. 
Swinburne is one of many contemporary philosophers of religion who 
appeal to religious experience but do so in a non-evidentialist way, on 
the basis of a direct realist theory of perception. He thus takes a stance 
toward religious experience that puts him in the company of Alston and 
the others.
Where does reid come into the picture sketched thus far? There is 
a direct link to him. Alston, Plantinga and Wolterstorff3 all write about 
him and cite him as a source for their general epistemological strategies. 
There is also an indirect link. The views about the justification and 
character of sense-perceptual beliefs that have become an orthodoxy 
in so much contemporary religious epistemology are reidian. They 
are strikingly similar to the relevant parts of reid in An Inquiry Into 
the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense and the Essays on 
the Intellectual Powers of Man. but we shall see that the coincidence 
of these views on perception with reid’s does not demonstrate a  real 
indebtedness to reid. We shall also point out that reid’s own views on 
the justification of religious belief are not at all similar to those of the 
reformed epistemologists.
2 richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd edn 2004)
3 Wolterstorff has a monograph on reid: Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2001)
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I. reFormeD ePIStemoloGY AND reID
‘reformed epistemology’ is a label given to a loosely-connected group of 
thinkers who have challenged a long-established orthodoxy in religious 
epistemology. The orthodoxy states that if religious beliefs are to be 
rational, they must be based on evidence. both Plantinga and Wolterstorff 
began to question this orthodoxy in articles and books in the 1970’s (in 
fact in Wolterstorff ’s case as early as 1967 in Reason within the Bounds of 
Religion4). Plantinga’s way of formulating the critique became the most 
famous5. 
According to Plantinga, the orthodoxy rests upon the key premise 
that religious beliefs cannot be properly basic beliefs. A basic belief is 
construed by analogy with a basic action, where the latter is an action 
I  perform without doing anything else in order to perform it. A basic 
belief is one I  hold while not inferring it from any other beliefs. It is 
properly basic belief if I  am justified, rational, warranted, etc., in so 
holding it. The orthodoxy about religious beliefs and evidence is held to 
flow from locke and to have been established in religious epistemology 
since. The only reason to hold to the orthodoxy Plantinga can think of is 
‘classical foundationalism’. This epistemological stance maintains that the 
only properly basic beliefs are those which are self-evident in themselves 
(‘All bachelors are unmarried’) or self-evident to me (‘I seem to see a desk 
before me’). Such propositions are indubitable and incorrigible. All other 
propositions that I believe with justification are deductive or inductive 
inferences therefrom. Propositions like ‘God spoke to me in prayer’ and 
‘God exists’ are not thus self-evident, indubitable and incorrigible, are 
not properly basic and therefore need to be supported by deductive or 
inductive inferences from those that are. Thus is launched a familiar task 
of seeking the ‘evidences’ for theistic and Christian beliefs in modern 
philosophy of religion. The door for philosophical scepticism regarding 
4 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason within the Bounds of Religion (Grand rapids: eerdman, 1967)
5 Plantinga’s early papers in religious epistemology include: ‘Is belief in God rational?’ 
in Rationality and Religious Belief, ed. C. Delaney (Notre Dame: Notre Dame university 
Press, 1979); ‘Is belief in God Properly basic?’, Nous, vol. 15/1, 1981; ‘The reformed 
objection to Natural Theology’ in Rationality in the Calvininan Tradition eds H. Hart, 
J. van der Hoeven, N. Wolterstorff (lanham: university Press of America, 1983); ‘reason 
and belief in God’, in Faith and Rationality eds A. Plantinga and N. Wolterstorff (Notre 
Dame: Notre Dame university Press, 1983).
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those beliefs is thereby opened. This scepticism is equally characteristic 
of modern philosophy of religion – since it is easy to pick holes in the 
arguments of natural theology and press the weight of counter-evidence 
provided by such things as the problem of evil.
Plantinga thinks that classical foundationalism is easily refuted. First 
it is self-referentially incoherent and second it faces innumerable counter 
examples in the shape of properly basic beliefs that do not fit its criteria.
The first point above can be stated quite briefly: the proposition ‘All 
properly basic beliefs are self-evident to in themselves or self-evident to 
me’ is not self-evident in itself or self-evident to me [Alvin Plantinga!]. 
It therefore needs to rest on an inferential proof and Plantinga thinks no 
one has come up with a deductive or inductive argument that remotely 
comes near to being such a proof. 
The second point in the Plantingian critique consists in maintaining 
that all manner of kinds of belief are properly basic that do not conform 
to the criteria of self-evidence, indubitability and incorrigibility. Thus: 
‘I had an egg for breakfast this morning’ and ‘There is a greenfinch in 
my garden’ can in appropriate circumstances be justifiably believed by the 
subject even though they are in no sense inferred from other beliefs. They 
can be, instead, the direct deliverances of memory and sight, respectively.
both Plantinga and Wolterstorff cite reid as a source of the insight that 
classical foundationalism is false. The Inquiry and Essays are appealed to 
as an early, but neglected, proof of its limitations. Crucial for them is the 
way in which reid attacks the Way of Ideas and its associated notion 
that ‘I see a greenfinch’ must really be an inference from the immediate 
perception of an impression of a greenfinch. They also cite reid’s plea 
for acceptance of irreducibly diverse ways in which beliefs may be 
justifiably sourced. His attack on the philosophical sceptic is held to be 
a paradigmatic demonstration of the falsity of classical foundationalism.
Plantinga’s early forays in reformed epistemology distinguished 
between reasons for beliefs and grounds. A non-basic belief (such as 
‘Australia is an island’) is justified if it rests on other justified beliefs that are 
themselves justified. Properly basic beliefs end the chain of justification 
because they get their justification from the circumstances in which they 
arise or are maintained. ‘I see a greenfinch’ is not based on reasons, but, 
granted that I  have normal eyesight, the light is good and I  know the 
names of common british birds, may rest on perfectly adequate grounds. 
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For Plantinga the belief that there is God for the ordinary believer can get 
its justification from being the straightforward entailment of beliefs such 
as ‘God spoke to me in prayer last night’, ‘I felt God forgiving my sins’. 
Such beliefs may themselves be grounded in surrounding circumstances 
in a way analogous to a straightforward perceptual claim. This grounding 
is fleshed out via the postulation of a sensus divinitatis. This is a faculty for 
being directly aware of God’s presence that, when excited by the requisite 
stimuli from God, produces appropriate beliefs in the subject. No wonder, 
then, that some commentators took Plantinga’s case for religious beliefs 
being properly basic to be an appeal to religious experience as the ground 
of religious beliefs.
If reid was one direct influence upon Plantinga and Wolterstorff, so 
was Calvin (in the Institutes of the Christian Religion) and a number of 
19th and 20th century thinkers in the Dutch reformed Church. Plantinga 
traces the notion of the sensus divinitatus back to Calvin (though we 
should note that there is critical literature questioning his fidelity to 
Calvin on this point). The Dutch reformers influencing our two authors 
plead for the autonomy of distinctively Christian modes of knowing and 
reasoning6.
reformed epistemology in the hands of Plantinga is a  thing that is 
subject to much change and development. The above gives the essence of 
his views in his early articles on the subject. Almost from the beginning 
he was pressed with an obvious objection to his plea for tolerance 
of many kinds of properly basic belief. The objection was that this 
introduces epistemic anarchy: anyone can claim that their foundational 
beliefs are properly basic once the criteria of classical foundationalism 
are abandoned. This came to be known as ‘the Great Pumpkin objection’ 
(a  label which will make sense to all those familiar with the Peanuts 
cartoon series). Various strategies for dealing with this objection emerged 
from the keyboard of Plantinga. one was to the effect that we might use 
an inductive procedure to determine canons of proper basicality. Instead 
of laying down criteria for proper basicality a priori, we might look at 
those forms of belief we pre-theoretically agree are properly basic and 
then work out what set of properties (presumably a  disjunctive set) 
6 See for example: Cornelius van til, Common Grace (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and 
reformed, 1947)
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they have in common. This suggestion rapidly proved worthless, since 
it struck the obstacle that there is no pre-theoretic agreement on what 
beliefs count as properly basic.
The introduction of the sensus divinitatus can be seen as another 
attempt to defeat the Great Pumpkinites. Properly basic beliefs need 
grounding in appropriate justificatory circumstances. So a  claim that 
a given class of beliefs is properly basic needs to come with an account of 
the relevant circumstances. The sensus divinitatis story does just that. but 
note that we will only accept the story if we accept the truth of certain 
Christian beliefs. Great Pumpkin rears its ugly head again at this point: we 
can easily imagine other belief systems, world-views, coming equipped 
with their own anthropologies. These will in turn enable such a world-
view to tell a story about how its foundational beliefs are properly basic 
beliefs. rose Ann Christian’s 1992 paper on Plantinga7 makes this point 
very clearly and shows that it is not just a notional one (being exemplified 
in certain Hindu and buddhist philosophical systems – see p.  568 of 
Christian). 
This is the charge then that Plantinga’s appeal to a reidian pluralism 
over sources of properly basic belief faces: it gives rise to relativism 
and subjectivism in epistemology. much of the critical literature on 
Plantinga’s early articles in reformed epistemology can be seen as, in 
effect, trying to circumvent his refutation of classical foundationalism. 
He affirms that only classical foundationalism will justify the insistence 
that rational religious beliefs must be based on evidence. His critics were 
charging that other reasons can be given for denying proper basicality 
to religious beliefs. Notably, what was being pressed was that religious 
belief is not the direct, unmediated outcome of ‘the standard package’ 
of cognitive faculties: memory, sense-perception, rational intuition and 
the like. What is distinctive about items in the standard package? – They 
are all faculties that we expect any compos mentis, adult human being to 
have. once we allow a sensus divinitatis to play the same role as memory, 
sense-perception and the like, what is indeed to stop us allowing a sensus 
pumpkinitatis to do a corresponding job for followers of Snoopy? Here 
is a question about the direction in which a reidian, moderate, pluralist 
7 rose Ann Christian, ‘Plantinga, epistemic Persmissivism and metaphysical 
Pluralism’, Religious Studies vol. 28/4, 1992
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foundationalism leads. Some would answer: to a defence of items in the 
standard package against the scepticism implicit in the Way of Ideas but 
not to Plantinga’s religious epistemology. (We will see below that Alston 
addresses this same issue about the universality of approved belief-
forming mechanisms.)
Plantinga’s work in religious epistemology soon moved in a direction 
that in essence meant he could leave behind many facets of the debate 
on proper basicality he found himself embroiled in. He moved to an 
externalist stance on epistemology and upon the epistemology of religious 
belief in Warrant: the Current Debate8, Warrant and Proper Function9 and 
Warranted Christian Belief10. A number of features of this later stance 
distinguish it from the earlier attack on classical foundationalism and the 
defence of the properly basic status of religious belief. They include:
 - removal of notions of justification and rationality from centre 
stage.
 - Their replacement by the notion of warrant, warrant being whatever 
must be added to a true belief that will make into knowledge.
 - An externalist view of the property of warrant. Warrant is essentially 
that property of a belief which ensures that it has been produced 
by a  truth-tracking mechanism in the environment in which the 
subject finds him/herself. The subject need not be aware of the 
nature of this mechanism or that his/her beliefs have warrant in 
order for them to have warrant.
 - An account of warrant in terms of ‘proper function’: a belief has 
warrant if and only if it is the product of cognitive faculties that 
are functioning properly in an environment that enables them to 
deliver true beliefs (or: more true beliefs than false). In addition, 
the relevant faculties have to be the product of a design plan that 
means that they do produce true beliefs in the environment in 
question. The design plan has to be a good one, ensuring that there 
is a high statistical probability that true beliefs will be produced by 
these faculties in this environment.
8   Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate (NY: oxford university Press, 1993)
9  Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (NY: oxford university Press, 1993)
10 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (NY: oxford university Press, 2000)
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The account of warrant in terms of proper function seems to me to be 
at root a refinement on reliabilism: true beliefs are knowledge if they are 
produced by reliable cognitive faculties.
The reasons why the warrant epistemology of late Plantinga leaves 
behind the earlier debates we have documented can now be spelled 
out. Notice that he now has an overwhelming reason to reject classical 
foundationalism. That view was part of an attempt to seek some internal 
(i.e. open to conscious reflection) property of beliefs that would enable 
us to tell when our beliefs are rationally held. externalism sweeps this 
attempt aside. Plantinga’s warrant approach entails straight off that we 
cannot do epistemology independent of some anthropology or other. We 
need an account of what cognitive faculties there are, how they function 
and who or what designed them. This means, as he is fond of stressing, 
that we cannot tell whether Christian beliefs are warranted without 
telling whether they are true. If Christian beliefs are true, then they 
can be warranted for Plantinga. If Christianity is true it will provide an 
account of human nature and associated matters that will yield the result 
that we have cognitive faculties enabling us to reliably form beliefs about 
God. The sensus divinitatis is wheeled out again and supplemented by 
other ‘Christian’ cognitive faculties (in particular, our receptivity to the 
instigations of the Holy Spirit). These faculties, if real, would enable us 
to form Christian beliefs in response to appropriate stimuli. Faculties of 
inference then enable us to deduce further Christian truths from those 
produced by stimulation of the distinctively Christian epistemic suite 
that we possess. In a way, these parts of Plantinga’s theory tell us that our 
epistemology simply cannot be neutral as between our religious beliefs, 
so that the aim of seeking agreed criteria of proper basicality is now seen 
as deluded.
The warrant books have one further trick up their sleeve. In Warrant 
and Proper Function Plantinga has an extended argument that, in effect, 
can be seen as a  final attempt to defeat the Great Pumpkinites. He 
contends across chapters 11 and 12 that only a theistic account of human 
nature can provide an account of proper function. only if our cognitive 
faculties are the product of a design plan, and one that is good, can they 
yield warranted beliefs. So there is no proper basicality (to use the old 
terminology), and thus no basis for inferred beliefs, unless some version 
of theism is true. 
Peter bYrNe276
Plantinga claims that reid is one of the sources of the warrant 
epistemology. There are references throughout Warrant: the Current 
Debate to reid. He is cited as one source of externalism in epistemology 
(p. v) and Plantinga refers to ‘the debt my views owe to Thomas reid’ 
(p. vii). Similar references can be found in Warrant and Proper Function. 
I take it that the source for this attribution of externalism to reid includes 
such passages as the famous one about the ‘mint of Nature’ in IHM VI, 
XX. reid is asked by the sceptic ‘Why do you believe the existence of the 
external object which you perceive?’ He replies 
The belief, sir, is none of my manufacture; it came from the mint of 
Nature; it bears her image and superscription; and, if it is not right, the 
fault is not mine: I even took it upon trust, and without suspicion.
reid is taken by externalists such as Plantinga to be sharing in their basic 
assumption that a belief may be warranted even though the subject cannot 
articulate the ground on which it rests. It is warranted in virtue of being 
the product of cognitive faculties that are functioning well. The answer to 
the sceptic does not appeal to reasons or evidence in favour of our belief 
in the external object but to the fact that we are constructed in such a way 
that this belief arises in us. moreover, we must have confidence that the 
faculties that give rise to such a belief are well-designed and thus are to 
be trusted11.
II. AlStoN
William Alston is another writer on religious epistemology who claims 
descent from reid. In Perceiving God he offers an account of the epistemic 
force of religious experience. The account is structured around the notion 
of a doxastic practice. According to Alston’s general epistemology, our 
beliefs across a broad range of subject matters are formed within doxastic 
practices. These are shared and socially established practices in which are 
enshrined distinctive ways human beings have of moving from various 
kinds of ‘inputs’ (stimuli) to beliefs. examples of such doxastic practices 
include: sense-perception, rational intuition, introspection and memory. 
11 An interpretation of reid along these lines is defended in Falkenstein ‘Nativism 
and the Nature of Thought in reid’s Account of our Knowledge of the external World’ 
in the Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid, eds t. Cuneo and r. van Woudenburg, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2004), pp. 156-79.
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These practices are irreducibly various and they have to be taken on 
trust for the most part. That is to say, it is difficult, if not impossible, to give 
them a cogent external justification. much of Perceiving God is devoted to 
showing that ‘sense-perceptual practice’ (the doxastic practice of forming 
beliefs about the material world on the basis of sensory experience) 
cannot be externally justified (see chapter 3 of Alston). Sense-perceptual 
practice cannot be shown to be reliable on external grounds. This doxastic 
practice exhibits what is styled ‘significant self-support’ (roughly: beliefs 
generated by sense perception strongly support each other). However, 
there is no way in which it can be proved to be reliable when faced with 
external rivals such as Cartesian scepticism or berkeleyan idealism. We 
take it to be reliable and we are entitled so to do – because it is a socially 
established practice and no one has come up with a  refutation of its 
reliability. Well-established doxastic practices are innocent until proved 
guilty. Alston contends that the practice, within Christianity, of forming 
beliefs about God on the basis of apparent perceptions of him, is just such 
another socially established doxastic practice. It is like others insofar 
as its reliability cannot be proved on external grounds. It is like others 
insofar as that reliability has to be conceded unless there is proof positive 
that it is not reliable.
There are clear links between Alston and Plantinga. Plantinga’s 
early papers on proper basicality share Alston’s emphasis on religious 
experience as an immediate ground for religious beliefs. Alston states 
that many of the beliefs generated by Christian mystical practice will be 
properly basic: the subject will be entitled to hold them in the absence 
of inference from other justified beliefs. Alston also rejects classical 
foundationalism as an exhaustive account of the criteria for properly 
basic beliefs. (Alston makes these links on pp. 173-75 of Perceiving God.)
There is another clear connection between the two authors. Alston’s 
doxastic practice approach to epistemology is, broadly, an externalist 
one. on p. 75 he rejects the key requirement of internalism on justified 
belief that “the justificational status of a belief is, at last typically, open 
to the reflective grasp of the subject”. In particular, Alston denies the 
condition that a subject who has an adequate ground for his/her belief 
must be justified in supposing that the ground is adequate. This particular 
condition generates a  vicious infinite regress. Alston does make some 
concessions to internalism, but it will be seen that epistemic subjects can 
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have justified beliefs for him if those subjects form them within socially 
established, and presumed reliable, doxastic practices while simply taking 
those practices on trust in an unreflective way. So, he too has a general 
and a religious epistemology that is removed from evidentialism.
As with Plantinga, so with Alston: reid is cited as a  prime source 
for the doxastic practice approach to epistemology. Alston in fact links 
reid with Wittgenstein (the Wittgenstein of On Certainty). These are the 
two authors from whose writings he has derived the doxastic practice 
approach. Alston thinks he has support in reid for the notion that 
doxastic practices are irreducibly plural. Where reid speaks of a variety 
of evidences for beliefs, Alston speaks of a variety of doxastic practices 
(p. 164). reid is one with Alston in protesting against the likes of Plato and 
Descartes and their insistence that nothing counts as knowledge unless 
it meets the highest conceivable standards and in the counter-insistence 
that the sources of knowledge are irreducibly plural (pp. 234-35). Alston 
quotes the reid passage given above appealing to Nature, and another 
passage from IHM V, VII, in reply to the sceptic as indicating that reid 
thinks with Alston that our established doxastic practices have to be 
relied on because
they are firmly established doxastic practices, so firmly established that 
‘we cannot help it’; and we have exactly the same basis for trusting sense-
perception, memory, nondeductive reasoning, and other sources of belief 
for which Descartes and Hume were demanding an external validation.
(p. 151). 
What impresses Alston in reid, and what he wishes to endorse in his own 
epistemology, is what he sees as reid’s insistence on: the giveness of our 
routine modes of forming beliefs on the basis of external and internal 
stimuli; the variety of these modes; the impossibility of trying to get 
behind these modes and provide them with an external justification; the 
manner in which the sceptic must rely on these modes even as s/he seeks 
to question them; and thus the futility of the traditional epistemological 
debates between sceptic and defender of common sense beliefs.
Alston does note differences between his doxastic approach and 
reid’s. For example, he remarks on the fact that reid does not stress the 
context of belief formation in our practices: ‘reid’s perspective is that of 
a purely cognitive, mentalistic psychology’ (p. 165) – and thus contains 
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little emphasis on the social dimension of epistemology. Alston further 
remarks on the way in which reid only endorses ways of forming beliefs 
from stimuli that are universal to the human race, such as memory and 
sense-perception (p. 169). It is crucial to Alston’s defence of Christian 
mystical practice as a prima facie reliable doxastic practice that we accept 
as reliable practices that, though well established, are only engaged in 
by a percentage of the population. His apologetic on behalf of Christian 
religious experience is peppered with references to other non-universal 
sensitivities to features of the world – such as the refined palate of the 
wine connoisseur or the refined ear of the musicologist.
III. SWINburNe
In Swinburne will be found a more old fashioned religious epistemology. 
As indicated at the start of this paper, Swinburne assembles a  body 
of evidence for a  core theism, and then proceeds to marshal further 
evidence for specifically Christian claims about God, God’s providence 
and human destiny. He also gives an account of, and defends, the canons 
of right reason that must be used to show that this body of evidence shows 
Christian claims to be more probable than not. Great reliance is placed 
on bayes’s theorem as giving an account of the correct way of assessing 
the interplay between evidence for an hypothesis, our background 
knowledge and the prior probability of that hypothesis. There is a rich 
interplay between inductive and a priori considerations in Swinburne’s 
apologetic. In The Existence of God the traditional starting points of 
natural theological arguments (such as: that there is a universe, that it 
is ordered) are treated as so many pieces of inductive evidence for the 
claim that there is a God. but these are combined with wholly a priori 
epistemological principles, notably the principle that ‘the simple is more 
likely to be true than the complex’ (a synthetic a priori truth according 
to Swinburne12).
In contrast to Plantinga in particular, Swinburne maintains that, 
though there are many notions of justification, the important form 
of justification we need for religious beliefs is of an internalist kind. 
12 See his Simplicty as Evidence for Truth (milwaukee: marquette university Press, 1997)
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In his critical notice of Warranted Christian Belief in Religious Studies13 
Swinburne does not so much deny the truth of Plantinga’s account of 
warrant as declare that it dodges the key question that the religious 
sceptic asks and the religious believer must answer. This question is: ‘Are 
religious beliefs justified given our evidence and in the light of reflection 
on that evidence and the inductive standards we use to appraise it?’ 
only internalism asks the right questions and can thus provide the right 
answers. Swinburne writes:
Despite what Planting seems to say, there is a  clear and all-important 
question about whether a  belief is rational (or justified) which has 
nothing to do with whether it is justified by the believer’s own lights 
or with whether it is produced by ‘properly functioning’ processes. In 
a strong internalist sense, a belief of a person S is rational if it is rendered 
(evidentially) probable by S’s evidence. evidently – scientists, historians, 
judges and juries ask this question about their hypotheses. (p. 207)
Swinburne has many specific criticisms of Plantinga’s warrant 
epistemology (see his Epistemic Justification14 for these), but his main 
criticism of its use in the religious sphere is that it simply ignores the 
main problem. I would put that problem this way: warrant epistemology 
(and its predecessor’s appeal to proper basicality) opts for a  defensive 
strategy rather than offensive one. The offensive strategy of showing the 
truth of theistic/Christian claims to those not antecedently convinced is 
required. only this will suit a  world in which there is much religious 
diversity. Warrant epistemology only serves to show at best that the 
believer is entitled to his/her beliefs and that Christian belief is warranted 
if it is true. exactly the same point can be, and has been, made in critique 
of Alston15. Swinburne states the importance of internalist justification 
for belief quite clearly on p. 7 of Epistemic Justification: ‘it is only in so 
far as the justification of a belief is internally accessible that it can guide 
a person in deciding what to do’.
13 ‘Plantinga on Warrant’, Religious Studies, vol. 37/2, 2001, pp.  202-214. Plantinga 
responds in the same number, ‘rationality and Public evidence: A reply to richard 
Swinburne’, Religious Studies vol. 37/2, 2001, pp. 215-222.
14 richard Swinburne, Epistemic Justification (oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001)
15 See the brilliant paper by N. Kretzman: ‘mystical Perception’, in ed. A. Padgett, 
Reason and the Christian Religion (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994)
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For all Swinburne’s defence of internalism as the only relevant stance in 
religious epistemology, there are strong affinities between Swinburne, on 
the one hand, and Alston and the early Plantinga, on the other. These lie, 
as indicated at the start of this paper, in the area of religious experience. 
A crucial portion of the evidence for God’s existence in Swinburne’s 
The Existence of God is provided by purported experiences of God. It 
is a striking feature of Swinburne’s use of ‘the argument from religious 
experience’ that he does not present it is an inference to best explanation. 
The bulk of chapter 13 presents the argument as an analogical one. The 
use of sense experience to ground beliefs about the material world is 
non-inferential for Swinburne. He employs a  direct realist theory of 
sense perception. Statements such as ‘I  see a  tree’ do not rest on tacit 
inferences from facts about sense data. Such a statement is innocent until 
proved guilty. It is to be treated as justified in the typical circumstances of 
appearing to see something – unless specific reasons can be found to doubt 
it. It is justified in a non-inferential way, but it is defeasible. Swinburne 
appeals to a ‘principle of credulity’: we are to trust the deliverances of our 
senses unless facts indicate otherwise. (Nb this is not reid’s principle 
of credulity. That relates to our right to trust the testimony of others. 
Swinburne has a  very reid-like view of the independent and original 
warrant to be found in reliance on human testimony, but his phraseology 
is different.) Swinburne then proceeds to argue that there is good reason 
to treat experiences of God as analogous to sense-perceptual experiences. 
They too are innocent until proved guilty. They too provide good non-
inferential grounds for believing in their apparent object, provided only 
that specific reasons for discounting them are not established. They too 
are governed by the principle of credulity.
All the above is very similar to Alston on religious experience and 
early Plantinga on properly basic belief. The similarity is marked by 
Alston (p. 195 of Perceiving God). There is no appeal to doxastic practices 
by Swinburne in his support of the principle of credulity. rather, like his 
principle of simplicity, he contends that we have no alternative but to 
take our sense experiences on initial trust. If we did not do so, we would 
never get started in the construction of belief systems and would have to 
surrender ourselves to extreme scepticism. The principle of credulity is 
another a priori epistemic truth. Swinburne’s use of religious experience 
in his apologetics is also bound up from the start with his cumulative, 
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natural theological argument for God’s existence. one reason for doubting 
an experiential report is a knowledge that it is highly improbable that the 
thing apparently experienced actually exists. Thus we need to establish 
that ‘God exists’ has some minimal probability (meaning: it is not too 
close to 0.0) in order for the principle of credulity to apply in this case. 
It is important that the appeal to religious experience in The Existence 
of God comes after such arguments as the cosmological and teleological 
arguments have added to the probability of ‘God exists’. but notice here 
that there is no complete contrast with Alston. For he too has a role for 
natural theology in adding to the justification for religious belief provided 
by Christian mystical practice (see Perceiving God p. 295).
Swinburne’s use of religious experience within the context of a direct 
realist, non-inferential theory of perception is typical of many writers 
in contemporary religious epistemology. This approach to the argument 
from religious experience has wholly changed the character of debates 
about its cogency. The general approach to perception and perceptual 
belief at work here is, of course, very similar to that of reid’s. The approach 
is fully in line with reid’s attack on the Way of Ideas. We find, however, no 
references to reid in Swinburne. This is for the good reason that he is not 
indebted to him. The philosophy of perception and perceptual belief that 
Swinburne is working with is derived not from reid but from post-War 
philosophers such as David Armstrong and roderick Chisholm. Their 
ideas are in turn part of a discussion independent of reid that grows out 
of a reaction to the sense-datum and phenomenalist theories of logical 
positivists and of other 20th century epistemologists such as russell. 
I don’t believe knowledge of reid is a significant factor in that reaction. 
(I  would hazard that the work of Armstrong, Chisholm and others – 
consider here John Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia – predates by a long way 
the ‘rediscovery’ of reid in recent english-speaking philosophy.)
Swinburne’s appeal to religious experience shows, then, that there 
is a  strain of anti-evidentialism in his religious epistemology, one that 
softens the contrast between him and the reformed epistemologists. 
There is still a  significant divide between the main actors in our story. 
That is the divide between internalism and externalism in general 
epistemology and in religious epistemology.
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IV. reID’S relIGIouS ePIStemoloGY
We have seen that both Plantinga and Alston advance religious 
epistemologies that they claim have a  provenance in reid. In their 
opinion, not only does reid provide objections to the Cartesian/lockean 
foundationalism that favours the demand that religious beliefs be based 
on evidence anyone could recognise, he also supports the externalist 
approaches to epistemology that allow Alston to claim there is a distinctive 
doxastic practice of religious forming beliefs and Plantinga to claim that 
there is a distinctive set of mechanisms that generate them. We have had 
occasion to note above Alston’s lament that reid only allows universal 
practices/processes in non-inferential belief formation. We can take this 
point of difference further. reid is no reformed epistemologist. In the 
Inquiry and the Essays there is not so much as a mention of distinctive 
religious epistemic practices or mechanisms. Nor does reid appeal to 
religious experience, in the manner of either Alston or Swinburne. If Dale 
tuggy’s account of reid’s lectures on religion is correct16, reid answered 
the religious sceptic not by appealing to Nature and its dictates to us, but 
rather by good old-fashioned appeals to natural theology. He endorses 
the Samuel Clarke version of the cosmological proof and, in particular, 
the argument from design. tuggy (p. 295) quotes reid as stating
there is as much reason to believe that there is a supreme being, as that 
there are minds besides our own. From the actions of a  human being 
conducted with wisdom and design we conclude that this being has an 
intelligent mind, and that this is all the evidence we have of it … even 
in the formation of a human body, there is much more design displayed 
than in any human action. In both cases we see not the cause, but trace 
it out by its effects.
What the above remarks of reid show is not a parallel to the Plantinga 
of Warranted Christian Beliefs, but to Plantinga’s first foray into religious 
epistemology: God and Other Minds17.
16 In ‘reid’s Philosophy of religion’, The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid, t. 
Cuneo and r. van Woudenberg eds (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2004) 
pp. 289-213.
17 Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds (Ithaca and london: Cornell university 
Press, 1969)
